




Ethical approaches to animal-based science: Proceedings of the Joint 
ANZCCART/NAEAC Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, 19-20 
September, 1977, v + 159pp, ANZCCART, New Zealand, 1998.  
 
The Australian and New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in 
Research and Teaching (ANZCCART) is a body active in the 
promotion of ethical positions in relation to animal experimentation 
while continuing to espouse the benefits of such experimentation. In 
1997 with the (New Zealand) National Animal Ethics Advisory 
Committee, ANZCCART convened a Conference on this area and 
Ethical approaches of animal-based science contains the Conference 
papers.  
 
There are six key themes in these papers. In the first contributors 
explore the value systems which might operate in ‘animal-based 
science’. The expression has a rather ominous ring as it suggests that 
the use of animals is necessary to the science to such an extent that 
the science could not exist without them. Indeed the papers in this 
section do seem to take it as given that animals will always be used 
in experimentation in science but in a gentle way they do succeed in 
at least showing how ethics has a place in science, a position which 
still does not have complete acceptance in the scientific community.  
 
Two papers take up the topic of societal consensus, public policy and 
animal welfare awareness looking at public opposition to 
experimentation and how this has promoted ‘respect for individual 
animals, adherence to the Three Rs, and competent analgesia, 
anaesthesia, and after-care.’ (p. 49) It probably would be true to say 
there there is no societal consensus on this issue. However the 
opposition discussed is portrayed as rather simple minded. For 
instance Royce Elliott states that ‘It is still contended that animal 
experimentation has been of no benefit to humans’. (p. 50) One does 
not have to accept this belief, in order to consistently oppose such 
experimentation. It is possible to agree that there have been 
enormous benefits but argue for instance that humans have now 
reached a state of understanding and sensitivity towards other 
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beings such that experimenting on them appears a very undesirable 
option. 
 
The third theme deals with the recognition of animal pain and 
suffering and refinements of techniques to minimize both of these. 
This is well done. A short paper looks at how the Three Rs are 
promoted. This is mainly on the functioning of ethics committees. 
Some criticisms are mentioned and some interesting legal reforms 
suggested. The following grouping of papers explores the operation 
of animal ethics committees further. While some pertinent points are 
made the question about whether alternatives to animal research are 
sufficiently well promoted is not adequately addressed, yet 
replacement is one of the Three Rs which many writers say they 
support. 
 
The fifth theme is on vertebrate pests (eg possums, goats, pigs and 
deer) and their control. These are important concerns in Australia 
and New Zealand, with no easy answers. The final section contains 
an interesting collection of papers on animal welfare, putting animal 





Groves, Julian McAllister, Hearts and Minds, 230pp. Temple University 
Press, Philadelphia, 1997. 
 
In Hearts and Minds Julian McAllister Groves examines the dynamics 
of a localised political debate centred around the use of animals in 
medical experiments at an unnamed US university. The book focuses 
on two active groups in the debate, an anti-animal experimentation 
group called Animals Anon and a group of researchers who use 
animals in their studies and who began responding to the protests 
staged by Animals Anon. Not aiming to persuade the reader to one 
side of the debate or the other, Groves is interested rather in how the 
participants in the debate feel about animals in research, ‘why they 
feel the way they do, and how they feel about their feelings’ (p. vii) 
and to this end offers a vivid and interesting account of a range of 




He begins by outlining the main theoretical tool of the book; the 
notion of shame, which he sees as central to both ‘sides’ of the 
debate. The work of Thomas Scheff is used to identify the presence 
of shame in the motives and responses of both animal experimenters 
and protesters alike, this being the first of several similarities Groves 
constructs between the two groups. He locates himself at length 
within the debate by expressing sympathy toward Animals Anon 
and towards ‘animal rights’ in general though he does not make 
clear precisely what his views on animal experimentation are. 
 
In chapter two Groves identifies what becomes for him a major 
dilemma in human/animal interaction, that is the simultaneous use 
of animals for human purposes and the keeping of pets (where 
strong affective ties to the pets are experienced). How is it that 
humans can both love and consume animals? To some, of course, the 
keeping of pets and the consumption of animals as food and as 
scientific and technological aids is in no way a contradiction, rather, 
both may be seen as aspects of an instrumentalist view of animals as 
available to meet the needs and desires of humans; for food, freedom 
from disease or companionship. This account of animal use is not 
investigated however, and the perceived dilemma persists as a 
theme throughout the book, supporting the primary notion of 
shame.  
 
The ‘dilemma’ is particularly evident in Groves’ account of the 
members of Animals Anon, many of whom seem equally concerned 
with the simultaneous use of animals as commodities and as pets. 
Members are portrayed as primarily, though not exclusively, middle 
class women, pet lovers whose initial motivation as a group began 
over the routine sale of impounded pets to animal experimenters at 
the university. In relation to this focus on pets, Groves notes 
amongst these members a wariness toward expressions of sentiment 
about animals in debating the rights and wrongs of vivisection, and 
an awareness that rational argument may be a more effective means 
of securing public support. In contrast, Groves suggests, animal 
experimenters tend to shy away from scientific or overly rational 
argument, emphasising their connectedness with animals and their 




Both ‘sides’ are acutely aware of the strategic nature of their debate 
and the need to present themselves in ways that may prove 
influential to the public. Groves acknowledges this, though more 
consideration of the implications of the debate as a strategic exercise 
would have been most welcome. What does it mean that scientists 
feel the need to appear more compassionate and emotional while 
animal activists want to appear more logical and dispassionate? 
Some brief discussion of gender issues is included here, but a deeper 
look at the dichotomising of ‘hearts and minds’ both within the 
debate and in western culture generally might have yielded valuable 
insights. While Groves claims to investigate how people feel about 
animals and how they feel about how they feel, by his own account 
he is more likely to uncover how they talk  about animals and how 
they talk about how they feel. The relations between feeling and 
talking in this strategic context needs to be carefully examined. 
 
The book argues for a kind of continuity between the animal 
experimenters and Animals  Anon, suggesting that both groups feel 
compassion for animals and do not wish to see them suffer. Groves 
recognises that for scientists, this concern is primarily paternalistic, 
with scientists viewing themselves as ‘stewards’ of nature while 
many members of Animals Anon reject such a relationship. In spite 
of this he argues that ‘animal rights activists and animal research 
supporters are not as different as they have been made out to be 
with regard to their feelings about animals’. (p. 28) As feminists 
amongst others know, the difference between paternalistic concern 
for the welfare of a dependent and recognition of the inherent 
integrity of a being is fundamental. Groves’ failure to adequately 
understand the nature and significance of paternalism here relates to 
his earlier ‘dilemma’ about consuming animals and keeping them as 
pets. Where both consuming and keeping are understood to be 
aspects of a paternalistic or ‘stewardly’ approach, there is no 
dilemma. 
 
Groves uses his research into Animals Anon (twenty activists) to 
generalise about animal activism and to offer insight into ways of 
solving conflict between experimenters and protesters. 
Unfortunately his extrapolation from such a small sample is 
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methodologically unjustified and certainly, his descriptions of the 
preoccupations and views of some of the activists interviewed 
present them as relatively conservative within the ‘animal rights’ 
political arena. The group is by no means abolitionist in its shared 
outlook and as such, requires very different analysis and 
intervention than might groups with an abolitionist agenda. Equally, 
the theme of shame bears quite differently upon those who eat 
animals and keep pets yet oppose animal experimentation, 
compared with those equally opposed who do not keep or eat 
animals. While Groves creates quite a complex account of the 
differences amongst the activists, he notes that the only African 
American activist he saw was excluded from his study as ‘atypical’. 
(p. 151) His own varied descriptions would suggest that a ‘typical’ 
activist might be difficult to identify, though as I have noted, 
generalisations on his part are by no means eschewed. 
 
Broadly, the book performs an interesting shift away from the issue 
of animal experimentation onto the actors involved in the debate, a 
shift that is always a risk for those also concerned with the debate 
itself, as Groves claims to be. Focusing on the protagonists in a 
struggle over issues of suffering, justice or integrity is valuable 
where light is shed on the social context around that debate, or on 
strategies, their meaning for the culture in which the debate is 
played out and thus the potential for just resolution. Groves 
concludes by offering advice as to how the conflict between animal 
experimenters and protesters could have been resolved, suggesting 
that ‘for the grassroots organisations like Animals Anon, it is clear 
that small, symbolic concessions to the activists can diffuse the 
controversy’. (p. 192) Here, concern for the just resolution of the 
issue of experimentation on animals is superceded by the desire to 
end conflict per se, without concern for changes to laboratory 
practice or improvement in quality of life for the animals. This may 
be an effect of the shift away from the issue toward the protagonists, 
where the issue is discarded, in favour of a different ‘problem’; the 
resolution of conflict between protagonists themselves.  
 
The book ends by focusing on the insights that conflict resolution to 
be found in the animal experimentaion debate through accounts of 
specific confrontations that might have proved more fruitful if 
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handled differently. Clearly, both ‘sides’ are guilty of inconsistencies 
both in their material practices and the opinions they profess and 
perhaps what is most unsettling about Hearts and Minds is that while 
Groves offers suggestions for better ways to respond or 
communicate in specific situations, he rarely adequately draws out 
the significance of these inconsistencies to the failure of the 
situations or makes the inconsistencies central to the problem and its 
resolution. I have already noted that the book is not about the issue 
of animal experimentation, but about the protagonists in the debate, 
so that prolonged analysis of the subjects’ views may not seem to be 
appropriate. However, the value of his insights to other contexts is 
uncertain. The extent to which the issue of animal exploitation in 
medical research can be satisfactorily resolved through diplomacy 
more than through material change remains open, particularly in 
relation to abolotionist agendas. Certainly, it is not a tactic that 
remains untried outside Groves’ research context. 
 
Suzanne Frazer  
 
 
Lesley J. Rogers and Gisela Kaplan. Not Only Roars and Rituals: 
Communication in Animals,  x + 230pp 
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998. 
 
The question of enshrining animal rights in law is currently being 
debated in the New Zealand parliament. A bill has been proposed 
which will recognise primates' fundamental rights not to suffer cruel 
and degrading treatment. In an article in the Sydney Morning Herald 
reporting this debate, the World Society for the Protection of 
Animals is cited as supporting the recognition of apes' rights for the 
reason that humans and apes are 97% genetically identical. New 
Scientist, however, is quoted as critical of this idea, stating that this 
fact of genetic similarity does not justify the recognition of rights. 
Interestingly, New Scientist argues that the test of similarity to 
humans should instead be based upon language use: ‘Language that 
allows thinking about thinking should be the test of similarity to 
humans’.1 
                                                 




Even overlooking the question of the privileging of thinking in this 
view (why should thinking about thinking be more important than, 
for instance, thinking about feeling, or even feeling about feeling?), 
the question of language use in animals is one which has vast 
significance for animal rights. A book which deals in detail with 
animal communication, then, could have direct political 
consequences for the treatment of animals by humans. 
 
The opening statement, ‘Researching animal behaviour is a 
humbling experience’, gives the reader a good guide to the approach 
of Lesley Rogers and Gisela Kaplan in Not Only Roars and Rituals. 
This is a special book because of its rare combination of scientific 
learning and detailed up-to-date information with the authors' own 
experiences in communicating with animals (from scientific field 
trips and from their domestic environment), and their obvious love 
and respect for animals. This combination of the personal and the 
scientific blends in a highly readable and clear account of issues 
around communication across many animal species (from primates 
to birds and dolphins, amongst others), and articulates a clear ethical 
and scientific position on humans' relation to, and understanding of, 
animals. 
 
Rogers' and Kaplan's credentials in the field of animal 
communication are impressive. Rogers holds a Personal Chair in 
Neuroscience and Animal Behaviour at the University of New 
England, Australia, and is the author of over 200 scientific papers 
and a number of books (including Minds of Their Own: Thinking and 
Awareness in Animals).2 She is well known for her work in the area of 
brain development and function. In 1994 she and Kaplan also co-
authored a book on their field study of orang-utans, entitled Orang-
utans in Borneo. Kaplan is a social scientist and ethologist who has a 
special interest in communication in primates and vocalisation in 
birds. As becomes clear in the book, she is also very involved in 
wildlife rehabilitation, specialising in native bird rehabilitation. 
Rogers' and Kaplan's combined experience and knowledge then is 
scientific, personal, and practical. 
                                                 




Not Only Roars and Rituals functions as a clear and detailed 
introduction to the field of animal communication. Many of its 
chapters are issue-based, and cover the questions ‘What is 
communication?’, ‘Is animal signalling intentional or unintentional?’ 
and ‘Do animals learn to communicate, or is communication 
genetically based?’. These significant and fundamental questions are 
explored with numerous examples both from the scientific literature 
and from evidence from the authors' experience in living and 
working with animals. Two other chapters focus on communication 
in birds and mammals respectively, and there is also a final more 
discursive chapter on human-animal relationships. Issues of 
scientific methodology and research ethics are addressed in relation 
to the research reported in each chapter. Rogers and Kaplan give 
concise explanations of how such research is undertaken, note any 
problematic ethical considerations, and outline the logic of the 
research methodologies. They also suggest further areas of research 
in many instances. For the reader without a background in this field, 
then, the book's approach is very valuable. 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental question addressed by Rogers and 
Kaplan is that concerning differences between humans and animals. 
In their analysis of animal communication they are interested not 
only in the hundreds of interesting facts cited, but also in providing 
a point of view on the philosophical and ethical question of the 
human/animal distinction. In relation to this, Rogers and Kaplan are 
concerned to point out the error of assuming that just because it does 
not look as though animals are communicating we can know that 
they are not. As they argue, animals can be shown to communicate 
in ways which are neither audible nor visible to humans (these 
include the use of ultraviolet signals, ultrasonic emissions, odour 
emissions and seismic signals). The development of innovative 
research techniques (such as the use of sound spectograms, which 
can graph the frequencies of animal sounds which are inaudible to 
human ears) is necessary here, and Rogers and Kaplan give many 
examples. 
 
Even more basic is the issue of whether animals can be said to 
communicate in a way that bears any resemblance to human 
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communication. Using numerous examples, Rogers and Kaplan 
argue that animals do indeed communicate with intention and do 
learn to communicate (rather than such communication being simply 
a product of genetic programming). Citing the well-known examples 
of Alex the parrot (trained by Irene Pepperberg at the University of 
Arizona), Washoe the chimpanzee (trained by Allen and Beatrix 
Gardner of the University of Nevada) and Kanzi the bonobo (trained 
by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh), and others, Rogers and Kaplan 
demonstrate that animals can be shown to understand and even to 
use human language. This destroys one of the most central 
arguments made for the human/animal distinction, namely that 
humans use language in a unique way.   
 
Studies of animal-animal communication (as opposed to animal-
human communication) also indicate that the complex use of 
language is not a unique human quality. Rogers and Kaplan cite 
studies of dolphin and whale communications which show that 
these animals not only use unique identifying codes for particular 
animals (which are used like names), but that particular groups 
share communication elements which are understood only within 
their groups and by other members of the same species (thus 
forming animal communication cultures). These findings show that 
animal communications are not simply genetic but, like human 
languages, are learned, individually meaningful, and even cultural. 
Roars and Rituals leaves the reader with a clear sense both of the 
complexity of scientific research into animal communication and of 
the fascinating diversity of communication systems and abilities. My 
one criticism of this book is that the stories told in relation to these 
are often overly short and leave the reader wanting more details. 
The wealth of different tales is great, but it can be a little 
monotonous if none of these are developed to any great extent. For 
example, we are given tantalising glimpses into Kaplan's work 
rehabilitating birds and her resulting knowledge of their 
communication systems, but these are glimpses only. On occasion I 
would have liked to read fewer examples, but to gain a more 
indepth insight into one of the examples cited. The characters of this 




In general though, the book makes a powerful and important 
argument about the complexity of animal interactions and the 
problematic nature of any clear animal/human distinction based on 





Clark, Stephen R. L., Animals and their Moral Standing, viii + 194pp., 
Routledge, London and New York, 1997. 
 
In the introduction to this collection of papers, written over a period 
of some twenty years, Stephen Clark draws attention to two aspects 
of his work which may be of concern to some readers. First, he 
points out that those who seek them may well find inconsistencies in 
the papers, and will certainly find some repetition. While this might 
be seen as meriting criticism in a continuous work, it would be more 
worrying, in this context, if the papers showed no sign of change and 
development over time. Such change is quite compatible with an 
overall consistency which rests on Clark’s unvarying respect for 
animals and concern for their defence. 
 
A single example will serve to illustrate the point above. Four of the 
essays deal with the question of rights for animals. All four also 
include a discussion of utilitarian theory, and of the significance of 
the inclusion of non-human animals in the utilitarian calculation of 
the greater good. Although Clark acknowledges that the ‘good 
utilitarian’ does not believe in rights, he nevertheless explores ways 
in which some utilitarians have been prepared to allow rights to 
both humans and other animals, and he explores other theoretical 
routes to the same end. At the same time, it becomes quite evident 
that Clark, himself, is strongly opposed to utilitarianism which, in 
the final essay, ‘Modern Errors, Ancient Virtues’, he identifies as a 
principle ‘bereft of rational support’, and he shows little more regard 
for rights-based theories. He is not, of course, opposed to rights for 
animals, but sees them as being of little significance in practice. One 
must therefore ask why Clark has spent so much care in the 
examination of views with which he finds himself increasingly at 
odds. At one point, Clark seems to suggest that this is simply what 
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philosophers do, but there is, of course, a purpose underlying the 
activity. It is often productive to engage with those who seek the 
same end through different means. It may be even more useful to see 
that the same theory can be used to serve quite different ends. 
 
The second matter which Clark brings to our attention in the 
introduction is the fact that he writes as a Christian philosopher. 
There is little in the following essays which is likely to prove 
unpalatable to even the most convinced atheist, but this profession 
of faith is still of some interest. For most of its history, Christian 
teaching has expressed little concern for the non-human, and Clark 
specifically rejects what he speaks of as humanist Christianity. When 
he wishes to give examples of ‘ancient virtues’, of a time when there 
was more familiarity between human and non-human, it is to the 
pre-Christian Scriptures that he turns. These scriptural allusions are, 
in any case, rare, and Clark is quite ready for them to be treated as 
metaphor, but there is little doubt that his religious faith gives 
support to some of his philosophical attitudes, to his confident 
realism and to his holistic approach to the care for the biosphere. 
What interests me most in this book, however, is not that Clark is a 
professed Christian, but that he is a professed zoophile with an 
interest in both biology and ethology. 
 
Although I do not wish to underestimate the contribution made by 
Peter Singer to the debate on the treatment of animals, I have always 
been somewhat disconcerted by his simultaneous dismissal of 
‘animal-lovers’ and his insistence that the moral principle of equal 
consideration of interests should not be arbitrarily restricted to 
members of our own species. It is difficult to see how we can give 
any rational consideration of interests to members of a species about 
which we know little and care nothing. Like Singer, Clark is fully 
aware of the dangers of sentimentalism, but he argues that 
sentiment, that is, personal and unreflective attachment or attraction, 
may be the prelude to rational discovery. In ‘The Consciousness of 
Animals’, he suggests that knowledge arises from a loving attention 
to what is knowable, a view that he fully recognises as a rejection of 
the postulates of the Enlightenment. It is just such attention to a 
creature’s particularity that gives us the hope of discovering what it 
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perceives and how it does so, knowledge which would make us the 
better able to consider its interests. 
 
Clark does not only link sentiment and knowledge, but argues 
strongly that natural sentiments are the necessary roots of morality. 
Morality does not develop through the exercise of reason, but 
through local and familial concerns for children and friends. As 
Clark says, aphoristically, we are moral because we are mammalian, 
and there is much evidence to support his view. Behaviour that we 
regard as good, care for those in need of care, is to be found in 
mammals other than humans, and this care is not always confined to 
conspecifics. Certainly, as Clark points out, the human family, from 
its beginnings, has included members of other species. Clark is not 
suggesting that reason has no part in morality, or that moral 
obligation ends with the family, or even at the threshold of the cities 
that he sees as the set of households, but, however far our 
responsibility extends, even if it is over the whole earth and into 
space, our moral sensibility develops in our immediate family and is 
extended from there. 
 
There will no doubt be some who find Clark’s views objectionable. 
As he, himself, admits, if he is right, it is not possible to quite 
eliminate subjective discrimination without destroying the natural 
roots of our morality. One might argue that this is accurate 
observation rather than theory, but there will be those who seek 
greater objectivity and prefer to see morality as the province of 
rational adults, presumably human, even if their duty of care 
extends to members of other species. 
 
Tom Regan, whose work is discussed in several essays, shares with 
Clark the view that there is no discoverable difference between all 
humans and all non-humans that would license different moral 
treatment, but he attempts to justify this view in a very different 
way. Regan makes use of the Kantian notion of the human subject as 
end-in-itself and therefore worthy of respect. He notes that for Kant 
the subject is a rational subject and that this excludes some human 
beings, infants and the senile, for example, and he suggests a 
different category, subject-of-a-life, which would include the 
previously excluded, both human and other animals. Clark treats 
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Regan’s arguments sympathetically, but he points out that the only 
rights that all subjects-of-a-life could have seem to be the very 
minimal ones of extreme right-wing liberalism. As he says, what 
concerns him is not abstract political rights but concrete historical 
ones, and he admits, quite frankly, that he is more concerned about 
the rights of ‘British beasts’ than about the natural rights of all other 
animals. This is wholly in accord with his perception of morality as 
having its origins in nature, in the family, and I venture to suggest 
that, in the same way, Australian readers of this review are likely to 
be concerned about Australian animals. They are the ones closest to 
us, the ones with which we are familiar, and the ones with which we, 
sometimes reluctantly, share our territory, and these animals may be 
the natives who live in our gardens or nearby national parks, the 
dogs who sleep at our feet, or the farm animals on display at the 
agricultural show. 
 
Although I have attempted to give some indication of the topics 
addressed by Clark in this book, I have not been very successful in 
conveying the flavour of the work as a whole. Clark has indicated 
that he writes as a Christian, but I would suggest that he also writes 
as an Aristotelian. The two are, of course, not incompatible, but, in 
my view, it is the influence of Aristotle that dominates in this 
context. It can be seen in the frequent quotations, in the belief in the 
natural origin of the moral law, in the effort to perceive the quiddity 
of other animals, which is surely nothing other than Aristotelian 
form by another name. Above all, it can be seen in Clark’s constant 
effort to engage in constructive dialogue, to find a middle way in the 
many disputes which bedevil those who try to think about animals 
and about what it is to do good in relation to them. 
 
Felicity Sutcliffe 
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